Science, Common Sense and Reality by Sankey, Howard
1Science, Common Sense and Reality
Howard Sankey
University of Melbourne
Scientific realism and the return of metaphysics
An interest in metaphysics is now fashionable in a way not seen since before the rise of
logical positivism.  Diverse factors have contributed to this trend.  But in the philosophy
of science a significant role has been played by the emergence of scientific realism as the
new orthodoxy following the demise of positivism.
The positivists initially dismissed the topic of realism as vacuous.  But by the late
1950s, the holistic implications of the partial interpretation account of meaning united
with rejection of a sharp divide between observation and theory to foster a budding realist
movement in the philosophy of science.  A decade later, development of the causal theory
of reference provided the basis for a realist semantics of science, which prompted
reflection on metaphysical issues such as necessity, essential properties and laws of
nature.  Work in this currently active area is conducted in a philosophical climate that
came into being as the result of the emergence of scientific realism as the dominant
position in the philosophy of science.
While scientific realism has played a major role in the return of metaphysics, in
this paper I focus on a more basic position.  Scientific realists often appeal to common
2sense as part of the case for their position.  Commonsense realism carries with it a
commitment to metaphysical realism that is an important aspect of the return of
metaphysics.  It is not my aim here to chronicle the rise of scientific realism, but to
promote a scientific realism grounded in common sense.
Science and reality
With the exception of cultural relativists and social constructivists, scientific knowledge
is widely held to be rigorously established knowledge and the methods of science to be
a reliable means of establishing such knowledge.  Indeed, some hold that science is our
best, if not our only, source of knowledge.  But to say that science provides knowledge
is not yet to settle the question of what science is about.  The question remains of the
relation between science and reality.  Does science provide us with knowledge of an
independently existing reality?  Does it reveal the truth about the ‘external world’?
I propose a positive answer to the question of the relation between science and
reality based on a realist philosophy of science.  But before characterizing scientific
realism, I will consider the positions of two influential anti-realists,  Thomas Kuhn and
Bas van Fraassen.  I will then turn to the realist view of the relation between science and
reality.  As we will see, a significant issue emerges with respect to the relation between
science and our commonsense view of the world.  Some realists hold that there is a
conflict between science and common sense which leads to the overthrow of common
sense.
3Kuhn’s changing worlds
Kuhn’s book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, introduced the idea of a paradigm
as a scientific world-view that underlies an ongoing tradition of scientific research.
Science advances by normal scientific puzzle-solving based on a paradigm, which is
periodically disrupted by revolutionary change of paradigm.
One of the most perplexing features of Kuhn’s account is his repeated use of the
image of a change of world.  A historian looking at past science may “exclaim that when
paradigms change, the world itself changes with them” (1996, p. 111).  Paradigm change
is like space travel, “as if the professional community had been suddenly transported to
another planet where familiar objects are seen in a different light” (1996, p. 111).
Paradigm changes “cause scientists to see the world of their research-engagement
differently”, so “we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to
a different world” (1996, p. 111).
I prefer to interpret the world-change image as mere metaphor not to be taken
literally.  But a more common interpretation takes Kuhn’s world-change image in a neo-
Kantian sense.  Paul Hoyningen-Huene, for example, interprets the image in terms of a
distinction between the invariant and unknowable world-in-itself and knowable
phenomenal worlds that are subject to variation with change of paradigm.
On such an interpretation, Kuhn’s account of science yields a negative response
to the question of the relation between science and reality.  Science does not provide
knowledge of an independently existing reality.  It is impossible to have knowledge of the
world-in-itself.  Knowledge is confined to phenomenal worlds.  But a phenomenal world
4is not an independently existing reality.  It is a constructed world built out of human
concepts and sensory perception.  Because phenomenal worlds vary with paradigm,
knowledge is a relative notion.  What one knows depends on the paradigm one adopts.
This may be a plausible interpretation of the world-change image.  But it is not
possible for the position itself to be maintained coherently.  The position asserts the
existence of a world-in-itself of which we may have no knowledge.  But in order to make
such an assertion, it must be assumed not only that there is a world-in-itself, but that we
are able to know of  the world-in-itself both that it exists and that we are unable to know
anything about it.  But it is not possible both to know that the world-in-itself exists and
for the world-in-itself to be unknowable.
In a later essay, Kuhn describes his position as a “post-Darwinian Kantianism”.
What he calls the “lexical structures” of theories provide “preconditions for possible
experience” in a manner similar to Kant’s categories (2001, p. 104).  In his discussion of
change of lexical structure, Kuhn reveals the incoherent nature of the position when he
writes as follows:
Underlying all these processes of differentiation and change, there must, of
course, be something permanent, fixed and stable.  But, like Kant’s Ding
an sich, it is ineffable, undescribable, undiscussible.  Located outside of
space and time, this Kantian source of stability is the whole from which
have been fabricated both creatures and their niches, both the ‘internal’ and
the ‘external’ worlds. (2001, p. 104)
Here Kuhn provides a detailed description of the nature and function of the underlying
“source of stability” that he claims cannot be described.  Some may be inclined to treat
this infelicity as an unavoidable paradox that arises when one must speak of the ineffable.
5But it is difficult to see why such fundamental incoherence should not be taken to fatally
undermine the position.
Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism
I turn to the constructive empiricist position proposed by van Fraassen in The Scientific
Image.  Like Kuhn, van Fraassen holds that there are limits on our access to reality.  For
van Fraassen, these limits coincide with the bounds of human sensory experience.
For constructive empiricism, the aim of science is to arrive at theories which are
empirically adequate, and scientists accept theories as empirically adequate.  A theory is
empirically adequate if all of its observational consequences are true.  Theories routinely
make claims which purport to refer to unobservable entities such as atoms and electrons.
However, van Fraassen holds that the appropriate attitude toward such claims is an
agnostic stance that suspends belief with respect to claims about unobservable states of
affairs.  Direct sensory experience is unable to determine whether claims of a non-
observational nature are true, since such experience only provides information about
observed phenomena.  Claims about unobservable states of affairs may be true for all we
know.  But we must suspend judgement about such matters since they transcend empirical
verification.
Constructive empiricism is a further example of a negative response to the question
of the relation between science and reality.  Van Fraassen does not deny that scientific
theories may make true assertions about unobservable states of affairs.  But we are in no
position to know whether any such claims are true.  Van Fraassen denies that we may
6have knowledge of aspects of the world that are incapable of verification by human sense
experience.  So, while science may provide knowledge of observable dimensions of
reality, it yields only limited access to reality.  It cannot provide knowledge of
unobservable aspects of reality.
As with Kuhn, this position is deeply problematic.  For one thing, van Fraassen is
unable to provide a uniform account of the use of instruments in science.  He must
enforce a sharp distinction between seeing through a telescope and seeing through a
microscope.  Because one can verify what one sees through a telescope by direct
inspection of objects seen through a telescope, such objects are observable.  But objects
seen through a microscope are too small to see with the naked eye and are therefore
unobservable.  Given the epistemic significance that van Fraassen attaches to observation,
the telescope may serve as a source of information about entities observed through the
telescope, but the microscope may not.  But the mere fact that some objects are
observable by us, and others are not, is no reason to suppose that the principles which
govern optical devices at the macro-level cease to operate when applied at the micro-
level.1
A second problem derives from van Fraassen’s strict empiricism.  Van Fraassen
assumes that our ability to acquire empirical knowledge does not exceed our sensory
capacities.  Experience is our sole source of information.  It only provides information
about actual states of affairs that we are able to observe by means of our native sensory
apparatus.  The limits of experience are contingent limits that may themselves only be
7discovered empirically.  But they are nevertheless significant limits on our capacity to
acquire knowledge about the world.
Van Fraassen is no doubt correct that there are limits on what we may detect using
unaided sense perception.  But to impose such a strict empiricist restriction on the extent
of our knowledge is to radically downplay the powers of human reason.2  We may have
no source of information about the world other than the evidence available to our senses.
But such information may still be employed as the basis for theoretical science.  Scientists
develop theories about the nature of unobservable entities whose behaviour gives rise to
observed phenomena.  They conduct tests of the predictive consequences of such theories,
which either confirm or disconfirm the theories.  Theories may successfully predict a
range of previously unobserved phenomena, the occurrence of which is difficult to
explain if the theories are not at least approximately true.  Reasoning about such
unobservable matters is, of course, a fallible exercise.  Its outcomes are less certain than
the information directly available on the basis of immediate sense perception, though that,
too, is fallible.  Yet there is no need to postulate any sort of direct cognitive access to
unobservable states of affairs to recognize that our capacity to reason takes us well
beyond the limits of the merely observable.
Scientific realism
The two positions I have just considered are sceptical positions, either with respect to the
world-in-itself or with respect to unobservable aspects of reality.  By contrast, I wish to
defend the view that we are indeed able to obtain knowledge of an independent reality.
8Such knowledge is restricted neither to a phenomenal world constituted out of concepts
and sensory input nor to aspects of reality that may be observed by means of unaided
sensory experience.
The anti-sceptical position I defend is the position of scientific realism.  For the
scientific realist, the aim of science is to arrive at the truth about the world.  Scientific
progress consists in progress toward the truth.  The world we inhabit, and which science
investigates, is an objective reality that exists independently of human cognitive activity.
We interact with this world by means of our actions, which are based on our mental
states.  But we do not create this world.  Nor does it depend in any way upon our beliefs,
concepts, experience or language.
The result of successful scientific investigation is knowledge.  Scientists discover
facts about unobservable entities whose behaviour is responsible for the behaviour of
observable entities.  They propose theories which refer to unobservable entities in order
to explain observed phenomena.  Empirical evidence provides reason to believe that
theories which refer to unobservable entities are true.  Scientific knowledge is not
restricted to an observable or phenomenal realm.  It extends to the underlying nature of
reality by identifying unobservable causes of observed phenomena.
As science progresses, theories approach the truth by providing increasingly
accurate descriptions of entities identified by earlier scientists.  Early theories tell us a
certain amount of truth about the entities that have been identified.  Later theories
increase the truth known about the entities referred to by earlier theories.  Truth is a
relation of correspondence between an assertion and reality.  An assertion is true provided
9that what the assertion states to be the case is in fact the case.  Whether an assertion about
the world is true is an objective matter.  It depends on how things stand in the mind-
independent world, rather than on what scientists believe to be the case.
A number of considerations combine to support scientific realism.  In the first
place, reflection on the place of humans in the natural world reveals that the
overwhelming preponderance of items found in our immediate environment –  to say
nothing of the remainder of the universe – exist independently of human thought and
experience.  Secondly, realism about unobservable entities is a natural extension of
realism about common sense.  Third, scientific realism provides the best explanation of
the success of science, since the empirical success of theories is best explained by means
of the truth or approximate truth of such theories.  Fourth, as an extension of this so-called
“success argument”, the success of the methods of science in producing successful
theories is best explained by the reliability of the methods of science in reaching the truth
about the world.  Together, these considerations constitute a powerful case for scientific
realism, though, of course, they fall short of apodictic certainty.
The realist position that I have just characterized presents a positive response to
the question of science and reality.  According to scientific realism, science provides us
with knowledge of an independently existing world.  As science progresses, it increases
the amount of truth that is known about the world that we inhabit.  But while realism
provides a positive response to our opening question, there remains one bridge to cross.
Science may provide us with knowledge of an independent world.  But what world is
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that?  What is the relation between science and the world of our ordinary, everyday
experience?
Eddington’s two tables
Throughout the history of science, new scientific theories from heliocentric astronomy
to the theories of evolution and continental drift have led to the overthrow of deeply held
beliefs about ourselves and the world around us.  This leads some to suppose there is a
deep conflict between science and common sense.
Arthur Eddington began his Gifford lectures in the following terms:
I have settled down to the task of writing these lectures and have drawn up
my chairs to my two tables.  Two tables! ... One of them has been familiar
to me from earliest years.  It is a commonplace object of that environment
which I call the world ... It has extension; it is comparatively permanent; it
is coloured; above all it is substantial   ...  Table No. 2 is my scientific table
... My scientific table is mostly emptiness. Sparsely scattered in that
emptiness are numerous electric charges rushing about with great speed ...
There is nothing substantial about my second table.  It is nearly all empty
space ... my second scientific table is the only one which is really there –
whatever ‘there’ may be. (1933, pp. xi-xiv)
Note Eddington’s words:  the “scientific table is the only one which is really there”.  This
suggests that the solid, “substantial” table of common sense does not in fact exist.  Only
the insubstantial, mostly empty “scientific table” is real.  Thus, the example of
Eddington’s table appears to be a case in which science rejects common sense.  The table
of science is real.  The table of common sense is an illusion.
There may well be a conflict between the scientific and commonsense description
of the table.  But Eddington’s contrast between two tables is misleading.  There is only
one table, the one revealed to us in commonsense experience.  It may well be that the
11
nature of the table is explained by science.  Indeed, the scientific explanation of the
solidity of the table may well displace the explanation provided by common sense.
Nevertheless, Eddington’s “scientific table” is the very same table as the table presented
by common sense.
In the remainder of this paper, I sing the praises of common sense.  Like Quine,
I see science as continuous with common sense.  It goes beyond common sense, but does
not discard it.  Rather than overthrow common sense, science explains it.  Common sense
provides us with a grounding in the world.  It is the foundation upon which scientific
realism rests.  As we will see, it even provides protection against the anti-realist
scepticism of Kuhn and van Fraassen.
Common sense
Before attempting to say what common sense involves, let me say something about what
it is not.  Common sense is not the same thing as practical skill.  Tradesmen, athletes and
technicians have many different practical skills.  Common sense is something basic that
may be shared by those who possess different practical skills, and indeed by those who
lack practical skills.  Nor is common sense the same thing as deeply held belief.  Some
commonsense beliefs may be deeply held.  But there are many deeply held beliefs that
defy commonsense.  Throughout history, people have been deeply committed to a great
variety of beliefs that defy common sense.  So common sense cannot be the same thing
as deeply held belief.
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It may not be possible to draw a precise line between common sense, practical skill
and deeply held belief.  But common sense is more basic than either.  The idea of
common sense trades on two different meanings of the word ‘sense’.  We can use the
word ‘sense’ to speak about the various modalities of sensory perception, such as sight,
hearing or smell.  But equally it may be used to signify sound practical judgement, as in
having good sense.  Common sense is typified by our ordinary, unreflective awareness
of the world around us, and by the routine way in which we deal with objects in our
immediate vicinity.  Observation, and knowledge derived from observation, play a central
role in common sense.  But common sense goes beyond mere observation.  It is common
sense to believe that ordinary objects do not disappear while we are asleep and reappear
just before we awake, though this is not something that we could observe to be the case.
Realism about the ordinary, everyday world is part and parcel of common sense.
The world of common sense is a world of material objects of all shapes and sizes, with
a multitude of properties.  We acquire more or less immediate knowledge of such things
by means of our sensory experience of those objects.  The material objects that we
encounter in everyday experience are independently existing things with which we
interact causally by means of bodily movement and action.  But though we interact with
such objects, they lie beyond the control of our minds.  Mere thought alone cannot bring
about change in the world of objects.  The commonsense world is also a world in which
misperception and illusion have their place in the ordinary course of events without
giving rise to scepticism.  A robust sense of reality provides us with a reasonable degree
of practical certainty that things are by and large as they appear to us.
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Common sense gives rise to a body of beliefs about the objects in our environment,
the nature of our interactions with these objects, and the means by which we may acquire
knowledge of such things.  On the whole, we may assume that this body of beliefs is true.
This is not because commonsense beliefs are guaranteed in any way to be true.  Like all
beliefs, they are fallible.  But they have a strong prima facie presumption in their favour.
Common sense has a prior claim on our belief.  Beliefs based on common sense occupy
a central place in our belief system.  As such, they are only to be rejected after less pivotal
beliefs have been considered for rejection.  Given their privileged status, any challenge
to common sense is to be met with suspicion.  Any such challenge faces an uphill battle,
since we know in advance that it is likely to be mistaken.
Science and common sense
What I have just said about the special status of commonsense beliefs may strike some
as unscientific.  Throughout the history of science, scientific advance has been made by
the elimination of commonsense beliefs in favour of scientific theories which show
common sense to be mistaken.  To place common sense in a protected position is to create
obstacles to the sort of thoroughgoing critical inquiry that has enabled science to progress
in the first place.
In my view, this objection rests on two mistaken assumptions.  In what follows,
I will identify these mistaken assumptions.  I will then consider two further objections that
may be raised against the special status that I ascribe to common sense.
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Does common sense require protection?
The first assumption relates to the idea that common sense requires protection from the
critical scrutiny characteristic of science.  My point that common sense has a privileged
status does not imply that commonsense beliefs are to be protected from critical scrutiny.
On the contrary, they are subject to sustained critical scrutiny.  Commonsense beliefs are
put to critical test and survive such test on countless occasions each and every day.  Our
practical interactions with the world vindicate a commonsense view of the world every
day of our lives.  The point is not that commonsense belief requires protection from
critical scrutiny.  Rather, commonsense beliefs are among the most highly confirmed
beliefs in our belief system precisely because they are subjected to critical scrutiny on a
regular basis (see Devitt, 2002, p. 22).
It may even be speculated that the privileged status of common sense has an
evolutionary basis.3  Commonsense beliefs survive because they have survival value.  Our
species could not have survived if the majority of the commonsense beliefs on which we
base our everyday interaction with the world were false.  False belief does not typically
give rise to successful action.  Usually, it leads to failure.  The risks to survival increase
where action is based on false belief.  Common sense both promotes survival and is the
result of a process of natural selection.  This claim reflects a naturalistic approach to
epistemology.  But it is a speculative point, so I place little weight upon it.
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Does the Earth move?
The second error relates to the purported conflict between science and common sense.
It rests on the assumption that for science to progress, common sense must be overthrown
and eliminated.  But it is not clear that this is what typically occurs in science.  Scientific
investigation leads to new insights into the nature of phenomena known to common sense.
Rather than eliminate common sense, science provides illumination of commonsense
phenomena.
Let me illustrate the point with an example from the history of astronomy.  The
geocentric idea that the Earth occupies a fixed position at the center of the Cosmos, and
that the heavenly bodies revolve around the Earth, receives support from everyday
experience.  It appears to us that the Sun rises every morning and crosses the sky each
day, setting in the evening.  At night, the stars, the planets and the moon become visible,
and move across the sky in much the same way as the Sun traverses the sky each day.
But heliocentric astronomy teaches us that these appearances are misleading.  The
apparent movement of the Sun and other heavenly bodies is due to the rotation of the
Earth upon its axis, combined with the movement of the Sun and other bodies.  It is not
the Sun that rises and sets.  The Sun comes into view as the Earth rotates.  The Earth’s
rotation brings the Sun into view each day.
Geocentric astronomy has a basis in commonsense experience.  Because geocentric
astronomy was rejected in favour of heliocentric astronomy, one might think that
heliocentrism entails the overthrow of common sense.  Heliocentrism shows common
sense to be false, which leads us to reject common sense.  But it is not clear that this is
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what happens at all.  Our commonsense experience remains exactly as before.  The sun
appears to rise, traverse the sky and set each day, and the objects in the night sky appear
to behave in a similar manner.  The appearances do not change.  Nor does commonsense
experience.
What changes is what we think happens.  Our understanding of what takes place
is altered.  Heliocentrism explains why commonsense experience is the way that it is.  It
does not show that commonsense experience is false.  It explains why we have the
experience of heavenly bodies moving across the sky.  At least in this case, science does
not eradicate common sense.  It teaches us how to understand commonsense experience.
The assumption that science eliminates common sense, rather than providing an
explanation for such experience, may therefore be rejected as erroneous.
Of course, a single case of science preserving common sense does not show that
it always preserves it.  But there is no reason to suppose that the present case is in any
way exceptional.  Conformity with empirical evidence is a standard requirement for
theory-acceptance in science.  Because it is primarily observational, empirical evidence
typically forms part of or is at least available to common sense.  To the extent that this is
so, conformity of theory with evidence ensures that science preserves common sense.
Stone age metaphysics
We have now seen why the special status accorded here to common sense is not
unscientific.  Common sense need neither be dogmatically protected from critical scrutiny
nor typically be overthrown by scientific advance.  Still, it might be thought that appeal
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to common sense remains problematic.  I will now consider a pair of objections to the
primacy of common sense: the first challenges the epistemic primacy of common sense;
the second challenges its ontological primacy.
It is sometimes said that common sense is a false theory passed down to us by our
primitive ancestors.  It is the “metaphysics of the stone age”.  Common sense is therefore
to be rejected as outmoded theory, rather than granted privileged epistemic status.
As I’ve previously noted, commonsense beliefs are fallible beliefs with no
guarantee of truth.  But while this is so, the assimilation of common sense to outmoded
theory is to be resisted.  This is why it is important to distinguish common sense from
deeply held belief.  Beliefs to which members of a society or historical epoch are deeply
committed may be rejected in another society or epoch.  But common sense operates at
a more basic level than such transitory commitments.  The common sense enacted in
ordinary, practical engagement with the everyday world is the natural endowment of
humankind, and may well be shared with some species of non-human animals.  It is not
something that passes in and out of social and historical fashion, but a precondition for
successful practical interaction with the world.
But while we may defend the epistemic credentials of common sense in the way
just noted, the ontology of common sense is also open to challenge.  The world of the
commonsense realist is the world of ordinary middle-sized objects with which we
causally interact as we go about our daily lives.  But it may be argued that there is no such
world.  There are no such objects.  All that exists are the elementary micro-level entities
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discovered by modern physical science.  There are no rocks and mountains, tables and
chairs.  There is just “atoms and the void”.
Where this thought goes astray is in failure to appreciate the nature of physical
composition.  Ordinary material objects are themselves composed of more basic
components, such as molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.  To think that ordinary
objects do not exist because they are composed of microscopic entities is to assume that
a thing that is made out of other things is not itself real.  But the fact that a thing is made
out of other things does not mean that it is not real.  A computer assembled from
component parts is still a computer.  Unassembled computer components do not constitute
a computer until they are put together to form one.  The computer only exists once its
component parts are assembled in a particular way.  The ordinary objects of
commonsense exist despite being composed of myriads of particles too small to see.
In light of the foregoing, I propose that we treat common sense as both an
epistemic and an ontological basis for the position of scientific realism.  Indeed, as I will
now indicate, common sense provides a platform on the basis of which to confront anti-
realist views of the kind considered at the outset of this paper.
Common sense versus scientific scepticism
To return to the changing worlds of Kuhn and the constructive empiricism of van
Fraassen, both positions are sceptical positions with respect to knowledge of an
experience-transcendent reality.  Both positions run afoul of common sense.
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On the Kantian interpretation, Kuhn holds that in the transition between paradigms
the world-in-itself remains the same, but the phenomenal worlds of scientists undergo
transformation.  From the point of view of the commonsense realist, however, this is
false.  The beliefs, concepts and theories that scientists apply to the world may be
profoundly affected by scientific revolution.  But scientists inhabit the same world before
and after a revolution.  There is one world, the world of common sense.  This world does
not undergo radical transformation in change of paradigm.  Adherents of alternative
paradigms do not occupy different worlds.  Scientists maintain common perceptual access
to a shared domain of objects before and after a revolution.  Practical action brings them
into direct physical contact with a shared world of independently existing objects.4
As for constructive empiricism, van Fraassen is himself a commonsense realist
who holds that observation provides access to an independent reality.  However, he holds
that knowledge is restricted to the observational level, so that we can have no knowledge
of what cannot be observed by unaided sense perception.  But van Fraassen
underestimates the power of common sense.  Minute objects that are almost too small to
see are a familiar part of everyday experience.  Equally, the compositional nature of
ordinary objects is a familiar part of our experience.  So the idea of component parts of
objects that are too small to see is an idea readily available to common sense.
Thinking systematically about the unobservable entities of which ordinary material
objects are composed requires an extension of commonsense.  It requires us to develop
and evaluate hypotheses about the unobservable entities whose behaviour underlies
observed phenomena.  The reasoning employed involves epistemic norms which fall
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within the methodology of science, such as criteria of theory appraisal and explanatory
adequacy, as well as principles of ampliative inference and experimental design.  But the
reasoning as well as the norms that govern such reasoning are no more than a systematic
refinement of patterns of inference employed by common sense.  So far from coinciding
with the limits of sense perception, common sense admits of systematic refinement that
enables us to extend knowledge beyond the range of what is immediately accessible to
our senses.
Conclusion
To conclude, the position I have described is meant to serve as the basis for a realist view
of science.  Science discovers the truth about the independently existing world in which
we find ourselves.  It starts from common sense, which embodies a realist view of the
objects of everyday experience.  Occasionally it conflicts with common sense.  But
science does not lead to the overthrow of common sense.  It explains why commonsense
objects appear as they do.  It explains why in some cases the commonsense appearance
of things is misleading.  But commonsense realism survives as the basis for our ongoing
interaction with the world.  Given common sense, scientific realism is the most natural
position to adopt as an interpretation of scientific inquiry into the world around us.
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1.  The point is analogous to one made by Kitcher with regard to Galileo’s extension  of the
telescope to the celestial realm (2001, pp. 173-4).  For the extension of Kitcher’s Galilean
strategy to the case of the microscope, see Magnus (2003, pp. 468-70). 
2.  This point is reminiscent of a point made by Alspector-Kelly, who speaks of “an
uncomfortable reversion to rationalism” in the realist search for “an inferential tool” that enables
a “leap over the fence into unobservable territory” (2004, p. 333).
3.  The point is made by Campbell with regard to sense experience:  “The survival value of
perceptual reliability is so overwhelming that the first creatures to attain it would inherit their
niche” (1988, p. 171).  A similar point was famously made by Quine in relation to induction:
“Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to
die before reproducing their kind”(1969, p. 126).  The appeal to evolutionary considerations in
the latter context has been challenged by Stich (1990, ch. 3).
4.  For a related point about the stability of common sense and its role in theory-change, see
Campbell (1988, p. 173).
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